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The transplantation of a legal governance form from one order to another is always 
fraught with difficulty. Perju’s Reply asks critical questions regarding the 
characterisation of future global governance and most particularly the use of 
constitutionalism beyond the state presented in my article. Perju argues that an a 
priori matter, whether constitutionalism is suitable beyond the state, is of critical 
import. My original article centred upon a “what if” question, what would the impact 
of an international constitutionalization process be upon the state and whether this 
would be an advantageous process, what Perju portrays as the ‘very option’ of 
constitutionalism. The sense of urgency which Perju finds apparent in my article is 
also perceptible in other recent attempts to offer options for the future of the global 
legal order. Alongside constitutionalisation, other narratives ranging from global legal 
pluralism to global administrative law form part of a much broader narrative of “what 
if" questions within international governance debates seeking to consider what exists 
beyond the classical state consent tropes discussed in the article. This rejoinder 
focuses upon several questions raised by Perju; transplantation, multiple constitutional 
orders and the link between normative and structural constitutionalism.
1
 
 
First, transplantation and the applicability of constitutionalism, as part of a process of 
constitutionalisation, beyond the state. Walker considers that the opposition to 
constitutionalism beyond the state relies upon four interrelated categories; 
inappropriateness, inconceivability, improbability and illegitimacy.
2
 Inappropriateness 
is linked to what Perju states as taking ‘for granted the existence of an international 
legal order.’ Indeed, the constitutionalisation debate and my article assume that a legal 
order exists beyond the state. Whilst not embracing Peters' claim that 
constitutionalisation acts as a bulwark against assertions of international law's 
limitations as a legitimate legal order nor wishing to dismiss outright those that do 
question international law’s legitimacy, this article rejects the need to begin every 
argument about the future of international law by justifying its existence as law.
3
 Such 
a requirement hampers any attempts to tackle the operation of the legal and 
governance order that exists beyond the state. Questioning the underlying rationales 
of international law is important but this is not a discussion which every international 
legal academic must confront in every article written about global governance's 
future. 
 
For the state to exist there must be international law. International law characterises 
the state and enables, at the most basic level, one state to recognise other states and 
treaty with them, go to war with them and pacifically settle disputes amongst them. 
While constitutionalism has its origins in the state, the latter does not have exclusive 
rights regarding the normative content of its governance that, at the very least, has the 
potential to operate in another order seeking to regulate the operation of politics by 
law. While there are obvious differences between actors, forms of politics and the 
structure of law, constitutionalism's concern with law and politics makes it 
appropriate to legal orders that pertain to the same concerns. Though this does not 
necessarily make it an inevitable or the most suitable option, it certainly does not 
make it, ab initio, inappropriate.  
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 The second of Walker’s list, inconceivability, is manifested in Perju’s discussion of 
the difficulties associated with constituting a system where to assert democratic 
legitimacy remains difficult. Indeed, democratic legitimacy is a stark problem for 
international constitutionalisation and law as a legitimate governance order. Habermas 
argues that even the EU has failed to establish itself as a demos (while accepting 
Perju’s critique of the limitations of the EU as a model, its competences and singular 
nature are instructive of the difficulties to be surmounted for constitutionalism beyond 
the state).
4
 The need for democratic legitimacy within a governance order is without 
exception. The democratic deficits and disconnect between constituent bodies and 
governance remain critical issues for international law. The constitutionalisation 
debate's normative character, at the very least, highlights this issue and enables some 
strategising of resolutions to this problem. At present, however, outside of the global 
legal pluralist debate, democracy remains under-theorised within international 
governance proposals. Without democratic legitimacy, global governance order can 
never be actually characterised as completing a constitutionalisation process. My 
article concedes the difficulties associated with this but also recognises that the state, 
due to its own internal constitutionality, can never supply the legitimacy necessary to 
tackle global interests without the other constituent actors in international law also 
being recognised as participants. 
 
Perju’s considers that the institutional arrangements within current global governance 
fail to, and seemingly will never be able to, grapple with the political character of law 
beyond the state. This fits within improbability in Walker’s taxonomy of critiques. 
While classical international law operated upon the assumption of the naked politics 
of consent-based law, as the second section of my article articulates, arguably a 
conception of the state expressed by commentators such as Raustiala or Sarooshi, 
conceives of a governance order restrained by law, (though not necessarily 
constitutional law). This leaves a space for constitutionalism as a possible solution to 
understanding the relationship between constituent and constituted power. It also 
recognises the potential for multiple constitutional orders which, as Perju argues, is a 
potential outcome of current governance trajectories. Indeed, the sectoral 
constitutionalisation debates, which focus, for example, on the UN or WTO, are 
entirely based on such an assumption, as would an articulation of a pluralist 
constitutional order which writers such as Teubner consider as potentially in 
existence.
5
 
 
Walker's final category, legitimacy, brings together the other three critiques on the 
basis that, if they are correct, constitutionalism cannot be legitimate beyond the state. 
Perhaps Perju's claim that the article mistakes the international for the domestic stems 
from the assertion that the structures necessary for both are currently absent and, in 
any case, are reliant on the state. Indeed, they are not present and the international 
legal order does rely on the state. My article claims that states will continue to play a 
role in governance though critically aspects of constituted power will shift to other 
points of operation as alternate constituent and constituted actors assert the 
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exploitation of their warrant. However, my article does not seek to herald an existing 
constitutional order but rather to ask what a global governance order may look like 
should constitutionalism become entrenched beyond the state. My article makes a 
claim for normative constitutionalism and thus the necessity of both a separation of 
powers model and democratic legitimacy in any system claiming that to be 
constitutionalised. In doing so the article assumes the presence of the state in an 
international constitutional order as a point of governance in a wider structure which 
builds in divisions of power and systems of review amongst the constituted power 
holders. The article also requires democratic legitimacy within states to enable them 
to act as points of legitimate governance while also necessitating that the separate 
global interests of other constituent power holders are taken into account and their 
warrant exercised within a democratic process.  
 
The arguments against taking a constitutional analysis beyond the state limit the 
nature and reality of both governance and law within and beyond the domestic sphere 
in seeking to monopolise forms of governance within one order. A domestic 
constitutional structure will remain necessary for its international counterpart to be 
legitimate. The international order requires a structural constitutional order based 
upon normative values, but such an order does not have to mirror or 'de-
constitutionalise' the state. Normative values have been established and developed 
within the domestic arena which is, the only type of governance order in which they 
fully operate, though not in identical forms. Democratic legitimacy and separations of 
power can exist outside of constitutionalism, though they are hallmarks of its 
presence. Their normative value remains the same no matter the governance order. 
They will be 'different' but their normative content and their definitional value if 
transposed elsewhere remains constant. Otherwise they are not democratic legitimacy 
or separation of powers but something else. The "what if" of the constitutionalisation 
debate asks how these normative values may be transplanted and Perju raises some 
important queries regarding the starting points of that debate. Where our positions 
depart is that while my article considers democratic legitimacy and separations of 
power to have an objective value whose definition does not change within different 
governance orders, be it constitutional or otherwise, Perju regards definitions put 
forward in the domestic arena, no matter their normative content, unsuited to the 
international order even if doing so identifies the stark current lack of legitimacy 
within global governance. But I think we both agree that before any transplantation of 
normative governance from one order to other can occur, the value of doing so needs 
to be challenged.  
